We compare value and credit relevance of fair-value and smoothing (essentially SFAS-87) models of pension accounting. We find fair-value pension accounting impairs both value and credit relevance of the combined financial statements (i.e. balance sheet and income statement) unless transitory unrealized gains and losses (G&L) are separated from more persistent income components. The inferior credit relevance of the fair-value model is largely driven by the abnormal 2000-2002 period which witnessed rapid deterioration in pension funding levels. During the more normal 1995-1999 period, the fair-value model generates more credit relevant financial statements, primarily attributable to the balance sheet. Overall, our results suggest there are mixed benefits to fair-value pension accounting.
Introduction
Current pension accounting recognition and measurement rules (SFAS-87) emphasize the attribution of pension costs to periods of employee service. Accordingly, changes in fair-value of pension assets and liabilities are amortized over expected remaining employee service through an elaborate smoothing mechanism. While this "smoothing" model generates a stable pension expense, the balance sheet recognizes merely an accrued or prepaid pension cost, rather than the fair-value of pension net assets. The smoothing provisions of SFAS-87 have recently come under unprecedented attack from various quarters. As a result, an alternative fair-value pension accounting model has been adopted or is under active consideration by the world's standard setting bodies. Under this method, the balance sheet reflects the fair-value of pension net assets and all changes to the fair-value of pension net assets flow through income.
The purpose of our paper is to provide evidence on the properties of financial statement numbers under two alternative approaches to pension accounting-the current "smoothing" model (largely consistent with SFAS-87) and the proposed fair-value model. 1 We use footnote information to generate income statement and balance sheet numbers under the fair-value pension accounting model. We then compare the time-series properties and the value and credit relevance of financial statement numbers generated under these two alternative pension accounting models. We define value (credit) relevance as the association between financial statement measures and equity investors' (creditors') future cash flow expectations, which we proxy through stock prices (credit ratings). The fair-value model should improve the relevance of the balance sheet by incorporating the most current values of pension assets and liabilities rather than a historical measure of accrued pension cost. However, income under the fair-value model includes transitory changes in pension net assets, which could increase its volatility and reduce its persistence. Thus, whether adopting a fair-value pension accounting model will improve or impair the value and credit relevance of the combined financial statements is essentially an empirical question, depending on factors such as the relative importance of the balance sheet versus the income statement in users' future cash flow assessments as well as the relative informativeness of the income and balance sheet numbers generated under the two alternative models.
We conduct our primary analyses on a large sample of firms over the 1991-2002 period. Our evidence is consistent with concerns constituents voiced during the SFAS-87 deliberations: fair-value pension accounting introduces considerable volatility in net income such that it reduces its persistence and even partially obscures the underlying information in operating (non-pension) income. Because of its lower persistence, fair-value income is less value relevant than smoothing income. However, contrary to expectation, fair-value book values are no more value relevant than those based on smoothing.
Consequently, the combined value relevance of both book value and income is significantly higher under the smoothing model than under the fair-value model. The inferior value relevance of income under the fair-value model can be traced to aggregation of the highly transitory unrealized gains and losses on pension net assets (henceforth G&L) with more persistent income components. After separating G&L from other income components, we find no economically meaningful differences in value relevance between the fair-value and the smoothing models.
Our credit relevance analyses compare the relative ability of various ratios, measured alternatively under the smoothing and the fair-value models, for explaining default probability. We proxy default probability through Standard & Poor's (S&P) long-term issuer credit ratings and use Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) to model credit ratings. Data requirements restrict our credit relevance analyses to [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . We find the fair-value model improves (impairs) the credit relevance of balance sheet (income statement) numbers vis-à-vis the smoothing model. However, consistent with our value relevance results, we find the combined balance sheet and income statement numbers are more credit relevant under the smoothing model. The inferior credit relevance of the fair-value model is largely driven by the [2000] [2001] [2002] period, when market conditions conspired to abnormally reduce fair-value funding levels. During the more normal 1995-1999 period, the fair-value model produces greater combined credit relevance. Like our value relevance results, there is no statistical difference in the combined credit relevance between the fair-value and smoothing models after G&L is separated from other income components (for our full sample).
The primary contribution of our study is that we directly address a current and contentious standard setting issue. The recent decline in U.S. corporate pension funding has provoked various constituents to harshly criticize the smoothing provisions of SFAS-87 and advocate the fair-value model.
For example, the SEC has directed the FASB to require balance sheet recognition of pension fair-values (SEC, 2005) . Also, legislators have petitioned the FASB to change pension accounting in a manner consistent with the fair-value method and even threatened to introduce legislation to force the issue.
Standard setters elsewhere (e.g., the U.K. accounting standards board and IAS) have already initiated the process of adopting the fair-value pension accounting model. Responding to these pressures, the FASB has recently announced a new project whose objective is the adoption of fair-value pension accounting in two phases (FASB, 2005) . In Phase I, the FASB proposes balance sheet recognition of the fair-value of net pension assets but retention of all smoothing provisions of SFAS-87 for income statement recognition, with the G&L reflected in other comprehensive income. In Phase II, the FASB is expected to eliminate some or all of the smoothing provisions (Moran and Cohen, 2005; Byrnes and Welsch, 2005) . Our results have important implications for these standard setting endeavors. For example, we show that fair-value pension accounting does not improve the relevance of the primary financial statements numbers (income and book value) and may even impair their relevance unless the transitory G&L is separated from other income components. While such a separation is envisaged in Phase I, it would not be possible if the smoothing provisions are eliminated in Phase II.
Our results have broader implications for fundamental issues under consideration by standard setters. The FASB has recently signaled a fundamental conceptual shift towards a broad-based adoption of the fair-value model. 2 Our results suggest important tradeoffs when moving to fair-value accounting:
while the fair-value model likely improves the relevance of asset and liability measurements, it can impair the persistence, and hence the relevance, of income. Our results also highlight the importance of separating transitory G&L from more persistent income components. Such separation is difficult if fairvalue measurements are incorporated at the transaction level, as currently contemplated by standard setters (FASB, 2004) . Our study also contributes to extant research examining the value relevance of fair-value pension disclosures. Prior research suggests both fair-value and smoothing based pension measures are incrementally value relevant (e.g., Landsman, 1986; Barth, 1991; Barth et al., 1992) . We complement this literature by (1) comparing the relative value relevance of the smoothing and fair-value models of pension accounting; and (2) by examining the combined value relevance of both the balance-sheet and the income statement. We show that the combined financial statements are no more value relevant under pension accounting based on the fair value model than under the smoothing model.
Our study is arguably the first to examine credit relevance, i.e., standard setting implications from the creditors' perspective. Holthausen and Watts (2001) question the generality of the value relevance literature's findings because of its exclusive focus on equity investors' needs. Consistent with their criticism, we find that there can be differences in the information requirements of investors versus creditors, i.e., an accounting alternative that is preferable from the equity investors' perspective (value relevant) need not necessarily be preferable from a creditors' perspective (credit relevant). Specifically, we show that while fair-value pension accounting may be more credit relevant than the smoothing model under certain circumstances, it is unlikely to result in more value relevant financial statements. These differential results likely occur because creditors (equity investors) relatively weight the balance sheet more (less) than the income statement and because creditors (equity investors) are interested in liquidation value (value in use) of the firms' net assets. Our results highlight the importance of studying both equity investors' and creditors' information needs when evaluating standard setting issues.
Finally, a few caveats and clarifications are in order. First, our purpose is not to compare which pension accounting model discloses superior information in the financial statements and footnotes; by construction, there is no difference in the total information disclosed by the two alternative models.
Rather, our paper seeks to compare two alternative models of recognition and measurement. We believe such an exercise is important-even though market participants, at the margin, seem to use all information that is recognized and disclosed when setting prices (or credit ratings)-for at least two reasons. First, the current standard setting controversy concerns how pension assets, liabilities, and expenses should be recognized, measured and aggregated in financial statements. The controversy is not about their disclosure-in fact, both fair-value and smoothed numbers are mandatory footnote disclosures under SFAS-87. Clearly, regulators and standard setters behave as if recognition and aggregation matter, even if disclosure of disaggregated information is sufficient for setting stock prices (or credit ratings).
Second, research suggests that recognition and aggregation can affect decisions of small and unsophisticated investors (e.g., Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt, 2002) . To the extent standard setting considerations are determined by the needs of small investors, the manner in which pension information is recognized and aggregated on the financial statements is important, even though disclosure is sufficient for the sophisticated user that sets prices or determines credit ratings.
Second, because all information under both models is readily available in financial statements or footnotes, our tests are not designed to address whether or in what manner the two models differentially affect user behavior. Rather, our tests merely use stock prices (or credit ratings) as parsimonious proxies for users' future cash flow expectations and report which pension accounting model produces aggregate measures that correlate better with these expectations. Third, by using stock prices and credit ratings as surrogates for future cash flows, we implicitly assume investors and credit raters correctly use all available information, including that in the financial statements and footnotes. Our inferences could be contaminated if, for example, investors overweight the currently recognized SFAS-87 (smoothing) measures vis-à-vis the disclosed fair-value measures. 4 Finally, our design does not accommodate any changes in preparers' behavior that may result from changes in accounting standards. Therefore, while our design has high internal validity it lacks external validity
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical considerations.
Section 3 describes salient design features. Section 4 presents our empirical results relating to time-series properties, value relevance and credit relevance of alternative pension accounting models. Section 5 concludes.
Motivation and theoretical development

Motivation
Pension accounting has been controversial ever since the FASB proposed SFAS-87. In its initial draft, the FASB recommended recognizing fair-value of pension net assets on the balance sheet and including all changes to fair-values in income. Strong objections from the preparer community forced the FASB to reconsider. The final version of SFAS-87 incorporates elaborate mechanisms to smooth pension expense by amortizing changes to the fair-value of net pension assets over remaining employee service periods and balance sheet recognition of merely the cumulative net pension expense net of contributions (i.e. accrued or prepaid pension cost).
Advocates of fair-value pension accounting largely focus on balance sheet measurement. They criticize SFAS-87 because accrued or prepaid pension cost can deviate significantly from fair-value-or the true economic value-of pension net assets. Additionally, they criticize SFAS-87's delayed 4 While we acknowledge this possibility, we believe it is unlikely our results are driven by market efficiency. For example, Aboody et al. (2002) suggest that any bias arising from possible market inefficiency in a price (levels) setting such as ours is unlikely to be material.
recognition in income of changes in the fair-value of pension net assets. Particularly disturbing to some are recent cases where the fair-value of a company's net pension assets declines, yet the company reports pension 'income'. 5 Overall, critics argue that SFAS-87 is potentially misleading because financial statements hide the true economic position and income effects of pension plans.
Supporters of SFAS-87's smoothing model, however, focus primarily on earnings. Their concern regarding the fair-value model is excessive pension expense volatility arising from changes in pension net assets' fair-values. They believe this volatility is 'illusory' because pension asset and obligation values are potentially mean-reverting. 6 They worry that aggregating transitory changes in pension net assets with more permanent income components could obscure not only permanent pension expense components but also, and more importantly, the firm's underlying operating income. This was one of the primary concerns voiced during SFAS-87 deliberations and is still a concern among corporate managers and actuaries today (e.g., Nyberg, 2005 (2005) and Buffet and Loomis (2002) . 6 At least three factors could contribute to net pension asset mean reversion. First, interest rates and equity prices may mean-revert (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) , which would make both pension assets and obligations meanreverting. Second, tax and ERISA regulations prohibit tax deductions for pension contributions if funding levels get too high and various regulations provide incentives for firms to increase contributions if funding levels get too low. Third, firms sometimes retroactively change pension benefits. Retroactive benefit grants may be more likely when funding levels are high pension concessions from employees may be more likely when funding levels (and the firm's financial condition) are low. These forces work to reduce the persistence of extreme positive or negative funding levels. (FASB, 2005) . Phase I of the project, which is expected to be completed by late 2006, will require balance sheet recognition of the fair-value of pension net assets. The current smoothing provisions of SFAS-87 will remain unchanged with G&L recognized in other comprehensive income. In Phase II of the project, the FASB will consider a more comprehensive revision of pension accounting, including the possible elimination of some or all of SFAS-87's smoothing provisions. In particular, the FASB may eliminate the use of expected return on plan assets and amortization of actuarial gains and losses, thereby forcing recognition of G&L components in net income (Moran and Cohen, 2005) . While Phase I is expected to be non-controversial, the elimination of the smoothing provisions under Phase II is expected to face stiff opposition from preparers (Moran and Cohen, 2005 (Black 1993; Ohlson 1995) . Thus, from a theoretical perspective, income and book value together perfectly explain price, i.e., are perfectly (and hence equally) value relevant, under both the smoothing and the fair-value accounting models.
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Two factors can cause divergence from this theoretical ideal. The first is measurement error. As we note above, fair-value pension critics point out that the fair-value of pension net assets may contain error because managers must estimate discount rates, expected rates of compensation increase and prices of non-traded pension assets. 10 However, smoothing income can also contain error because managers may err, intentionally or unintentionally, in estimating amortization periods for actuarial gains and losses and expected rates of return on pension assets. A priori, it is difficult to hypothesize whether measurement error more severely affects value relevance under fair-value or smoothing pension accounting.
The second factor is aggregation. When fair-value is applied to some transactions and smoothing to others, neither book value nor income can completely explain price, even in the absence of measurement error. Fair-value asset and liability pricing weights will differ from smoothing asset and liability weights, yet aggregating them into book value presumes identical weights. Similarly, the pricing weights on permanent revenues and expenses will differ from fair-value revenues and expenses, but aggregating them into net income presumes identical weights. 11 Aggregation has a greater impact on the value relevance of income than book value and likely under fair-value than under smoothing pension accounting. Fair-value G&L is transitory and its pricing weights are likely much lower than the pricing weights of more permanent income components, in particular operating revenues and expenses. Thus, aggregation may be a particularly important factor limiting the value relevance of income under fair-value accounting. Separate line-item disclosure of the G&L component can alleviate value relevance reductions due to aggregation and our empirical analyses examine this possibility.
In summary, fair-value pension accounting should improve the value relevance of book value, as it moves book values closer to fair-values. However, aggregating transitory G&L with more permanent income components likely reduces the value relevance of income under fair-value pension accounting more than under smoothing. Therefore, the effect of fair-value pension accounting on the combined value 10 Net pension assets also contain error if their current values do not follow a martingale process, making the current value an imperfect measure of future values. Net pension assets may fail to follow a martingale process because (1) tax and ERISA regulations prohibit tax deductions for pension contributions if funding levels get too high or low, (2) firms sometimes retroactively grant benefits and may be more likely to do so when funding levels are high, and (3) firms sometimes obtain pension concessions from employees. These forces work to reduce the persistence of extreme positive or negative funding levels. Also, prior research (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) suggests equity prices may be mean-reverting, which would make pension assets non-martingale, since pension funds invest heavily in equity securities. Unreported analysis shows that, in our sample, fair-value net pension assets are more volatile and more mean-reverting than smoothing pension assets. The notion that pension assets and liabilities are nonmartingale is one motivation for several of SFAS-87's smoothing provisions.
relevance of both book value and income is uncertain. Moreover the effect of measurement error on both fair-value and smoothing measures is indeterminate. Thus, whether the fair-value or the smoothing model of pension accounting produces more value relevant financial statements is ultimately an empirical question.
Credit relevance issues
SFAC-1 (FASB 1978) states that a primary objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful to both equity investors and creditors. Value relevance, however, measures usefulness only in terms of predicting equity investors' future cash flows (Lo and Lys, 2001) . While equity investors are interested in firm valuation, creditors are primarily concerned with default risk. Thus, creditors' and equity investors' information needs could differ. Holthausen and Watts (2001) observe that the exclusive focus on equity investors' information needs is a major limitation of value relevance studies. Accordingly, we also compare the credit relevance of financial statements under fair-value and smoothing pension accounting. We define credit relevance as the ability of accounting measures to explain default probability, which is an indicator of creditors' future cash flow expectations.
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Theoretical models linking book values and income to credit ratings do not exist. However, extant research and anecdotal evidence suggests creditors use footnote information about the fair-value of net pension assets in assessing credit worthiness. 13 Creditors are likely more interested in liquidation values than are equity investors and hence place greater weight on the balance sheet than equity investors do (Watts, 2003; Epstein and Palepu, 1999) . Further, book value's value relevance arises from its ability to predict "normal" future earnings, (i.e. value-in-use; Ohlson, 1995) while its credit relevance arises from its ability to predict liquidating values (i.e. value-in-exchange). 14 Thus, we expect fair-value pension accounting will produce more credit relevant balance sheet measures. Credit rating manuals also indicate the importance of "sustainable earnings power", i.e., permanent income (Standard and Poor's 1986). We therefore predict smoothing pension accounting will produce more credit relevant income. Taken together, it is difficult to predict whether the combined financial statements will be more credit relevant under the fair-value or smoothing models of pension accounting. Additionally, the aggregation and measurement error issues we discuss with respect to value relevance also apply for credit relevance.
Therefore, whether moving to fair-value pension accounting will improve the credit relevance of financial statement ratios is essentially an empirical question. Also, because of differences in the information needs of creditors and investors, it is possible that our credit relevance results may differ from our value relevance results.
Sample and variable measurement
Fair-value and smoothing pension measures
Our tests require we compute fair-value and smoothing versions of net pension assets and net pension expense. We measure fair-value net pension assets as the fair-value of plan assets less the projected benefit obligation (PBO). We measure smoothing pension net assets as the SFAS-87 accrued net pension asset plus the SFAS-87 additional minimum pension liability, if any. We add back the SFAS-87 minimum pension liability when determining smoothing pension net assets because it is conceptually a fair-value adjustment. Fair-value pension expense includes all changes in fair-value net pension assets due to reasons other than employer contributions (see Appendix-A for computational details). 15 Smoothing net pension expense is the net periodic pension cost firms report under SFAS-87. We measure book-value and income under the alternative models by substituting SFAS-87 net pension assets and pension expense with our corresponding smoothing and fair-value measurements. 16 We break pension expense into recurring and G&L components. 17 We categorize as recurring those pension expense components directly relating to pension operations. These are identical under both fair-value and smoothing and include service cost, interest cost and expected return on plan assets. We include all remaining pension expense components in the G&L category. For fair-value, these include (1) actuarial changes in the PBO, (2) prior service costs and plan amendments, and (3) the difference between actual and expected returns on plan assets. For smoothing, these include amortization of (1) prior service costs, (2) unrecognized net gains or losses, and (3) transition assets or liabilities.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Our value relevance sample is drawn from firms with necessary pension and stock price data available from Compustat's annual industrial, full coverage and research files. Net pension expense is only available in Compustat after 1990, thus our data spans 1991 through 2002. We hand collect accrued/prepaid pension cost data from 10Ks in the post-SFAS-132 period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) because of errors in Compustat. 18 Our value-relevance sample comprises 13,601 firm-years representing 2,258 unique firms, with fewer observations in tests having more restrictive data requirements. We obtain credit ratings also from Compustat. Because of certain data requirements, our credit relevance sample is limited to the 1995-2002 period and comprises 3,284 firm-year representing 536 unique firms.
We present descriptive statistics for our value and credit relevance samples in Panels A and B of Table 1 . Mean fair-value net pension assets is positive (indicating over funding, on average) for our 16 For income adjustments, we obtain after-tax measures by multiplying pre-tax measures by 0.65. 17 Our classification is largely consistent with the U.K.'s FRS-17, although FRS-17 further breaks the recurring component into operating (service cost) and net financing costs (interest cost less expected return on plan assets). 18 As a result of the disclosure changes required under SFAS 132, companies no longer disclose their minimum pension liability adjustment (MINPEN) in a consistent manner. In particular, while some companies include MINPEN in the reconciliation between funded status and prepaid/accured pension cost in the pension footnote, others disclose MINPEN in a separate table below the reconciliation. We find Compustat codes these disclosures inconsistently, sometimes including MINPEN in data item # 290 and sometimes not. We therefore hand collect prepaid/accrued pension cost numbers from 10Ks for the post-SFAS 132 period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) .
sample period and almost five times as large as its smoothing counterpart. This reflects the large excess of fair-value over smoothing net pension assets from 1996 through 2000 displayed in Figure 1 . The higher volatility of fair-value net pension assets relative to smoothing, suggested in Figure 1 , is confirmed by their significantly larger standard deviation. Our sample's smoothing mean net pension expense is slightly lower than the equivalent net periodic pension costs reported by Barth et al. (1992 Barth et al. ( ) for 1987 Barth et al. ( -1990 due to higher stock returns and lower interest rates for much of our sample period. Average fair-value pension expense is nearly three times that under smoothing, reflecting the large spike in fair-value pension expense in 2000-2002 (Figure 2 ) caused by the rapid decline in fair-value net pension assets during that time. The difference between fair-value and smoothing net pension expense is attributable to the G&L component, which is positive (suggesting, on average, more fair-value losses than gains) and almost three times as large as its smoothing counterpart. The standard deviation of fair-value pension expense (and the G&L component) is many times larger than that under smoothing.
Results
Time-series properties
During SFAS-87 and FRS-17 deliberations, many constituents expressed concern about the significant income volatility fair-value pension accounting might induce (FASB, 1985) . Fair-value opponents argue that pension gains and losses offset over time and therefore the income volatility they cause is illusory. These arguments eventually led the FASB to SFAS-87's smoothing provisions. Despite the debate, no evidence exists to-date concerning the impact of fair-value pension accounitng on income volatility.
Figure 1 displays the time-series behavior of mean net pension assets and depicts Standard and
Poor's (S&P) 500 index for comparison. Fair-value net pension assets appear positively correlated with the index, consistent with the over 50 percent equity component of pension fund assets (Amir and Benartzi, 1998) . Fair-value net pension assets also clearly exhibit significantly more time-series volatility than smoothing net pension assets. Also, smoothing net pension assets reflect asset value changes with a lag, as evidenced by their gradual increase past the sharp S&P 500 index decline during 2000-2001. We also find (not tabulated) that fair-value net pension assets are significantly more (less) volatile (persistent) than their smoothing counterparts.
Figure 2 displays time-series patterns in mean fair-value and smoothing pension expenses and the change in the S&P 500 index. The apparent negative correlation between the index and fair-value pension expense suggests the influence of equity returns on fair-value pension expense. While smoothing pension expense is relatively stable, fair-value pension accounting produces considerable pension expense volatility. This is confirmed by Table 2 Panel A, which reports that the average firm-specific standarddeviation of fair-value pension expense is over eight times that of smoothing pension expense. Figure 2 also suggests greater mean reversion in fair-value than in smoothing pension expense. Table 2 Panel B, which shows mean firm-specific persistence coefficients estimated from first-order autocorrelations, confirms this fact. Specifically, while the mean persistence coefficient for smoothing pension expense is 0.51, it is just 0.16 for fair-value pension expense.
The differences in pension expense volatility and persistence drive significant differences in income volatility and persistence, as reflected in Figure 3 , which displays patterns in smoothing and fairvalue net income. Table 2 Panel A reports the standard-deviation of net income is approximately 20 percent higher under fair-value than under smoothing pension accounting. Also, fair-value net income is less persistent than that net income under smoothing (Table 2 Panel B) .
Finally, Figure 3 shows that, while net income under the smoothing model is closely aligned to net income before pension expense (i.e., non-pension income), net income under the fair-value model often deviates significantly from non-pension income. Table 2 Panel C confirms that net income under the smoothing model is more highly correlated to non-pension income than net income under the fair-value model. This suggests that relative to smoothing, fair-value pension expense is so volatile that it even partially obscures the underlying operating income of the firm. This was a significant concern during the SFAS-87 deliberations.
Overall, our examination of pension net asset and expense time-series data suggests that, relative to smoothing, fair-value pension net assets and expense are more volatile; that fair-value pension expense induces significantly more income volatility; and that the volatility in fair-value pension expense can obscure non-pension operating income.
Value relevance
We measure value relevance by the explained proportion of the variation in stock price.
Consistent with prior pension research (Landsman, 1986; Barth, 1991; Barth et al. 1992) we use a levels (price) rather than changes (returns) specification. 19 Our first tests examine the value relevance of accounting's two primary summary measures: book value and income, both separately and in combination. We estimate various versions of the following model:
Pi,t, BVi,t, NIi,t, EMPi,t, and R&Di,t are stock price, book value of equity, income from continuing operations, number of employees, and R&D expense per share respectively (subscripts i and t identify firm and year). We estimate two versions of equation (1), measuring BV i,t and NI i,t using fair-value pension accounting in one and smoothing in the other. We include EMPi,t and R&Di,t as control variables in all models since Subramanyam and Zhang (2001) show their inclusion ameliorates the anomalous positive relation between service cost and stock price (Barth et al, 1992) . 21 Finally, we include separate intercepts for each year (It ).
19 While the price specification is economically better specified, it suffers from econometric problems, particularly heteroskedasticity (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995). Brown et al. (1999) suggest that scale bias can affect inferences from R 2 s when using the price specification. While we base our reported results on per-share amounts, scaling by both total-assets and sales produces qualitatively similar results. Also, while we report only pooled cross-sectional estimations, annual regressions-with tests on the means of the annual coefficients and R-squares-largely produce similar inferences for our full sample analysis.
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Barth 1991; Landsman 1986), we begin by estimating a bookvalue only version of equation (1). Results, reported in Table 3 Panel A, suggest book values are not necessarily more value relevant under fair-value pension accounting than under smoothing. The explanatory powers of the two models are virtually identical. In Table 3 Panel B, we report results from an income statement only version of equation (1). This approach is also used in prior research (e.g., Barth et al. 1992 ). The smoothing model's R 2 s and income coefficients are both economically and statistically higher than their fair-value counterparts.
We next estimate the full version of equation (1). Results in Table 3 Panel C show that, relative to Panels A and B, the R 2 s of both the fair-value and smoothing models improve. More importantly, the combined explanatory power of book value and income based on smoothing is significantly greater than that based on fair-values. Thus, our results suggest that a smoothing approach to accounting for pensions (similar to SFAS-87), produces more value relevant financial statement summary measures than would fair-value pension accounting. This result is primarily driven by the higher value relevance of income under smoothing. Under the fair-value model, the coefficient on income is significantly lower while that on book value is slightly higher, consistent with evidence in Table 2 suggesting income under fair-value pension accounting is significantly less persistent (Ohlson, 1995) .
As we note in Section 2, separate line-item disclosure of pension components (particularly G&L)
can alleviate value relevance reductions due to aggregating pension and non-pension financial statement components. To assess the effect of aggregation, we estimate various versions of the following model:
cost proxies for the value created by human capital and suggest the number of employees (size of workforce) and research and development expense (intangible value created by the workforce) as controls. We find adding those controls to the Barth et al. (1993) analysis indeed produces the expected negative relation between service cost and price in our data. Although we don't employ service cost as a separate explanatory variable, it is embedded in pension expense and thus may affect our inferences in the absence of EMP i,t and R&D i,t . 
BV-X i,t and NI-X i,t are book value and income purged of their respective pension components, NPA i,t is net pension assets, and PPXi,t and G&Li,t are the recurring and gain/loss components of pension expense as defined in Section 3. The extent to which disaggregation improves the explanatory power of the fair-value and smoothing models depends on the severity of the aggregation bias in the book value and income coefficient estimates from equation (1), which in turn is a function of the underlying variability of the pension components and the magnitudes of the differences in the pension and non-pension component coefficients in equation (2).
In Table 4 , we present results from estimating various versions of equation (2). We first estimate a balance sheet only version, by excluding NI-X i,t , PPX i,t , and G&L i,t . If the failure of the fair-value model to dominate smoothing in Table 4 Panel A is caused by aggregating pension and non-pension net assets, removing this restriction should improve the explanatory power of the fair-value model. Table 4 Panel B contains results from estimating an income statement only version of equation (2), which excludes BV-Xi,t and NPAi,t. We expect aggregating G&L with other income components affects the fair-value model more than the smoothing model because fair-value likely produces more transitory G&L than does smoothing. Consistent with this conjecture we find that, after disaggregation, the explanatory power of the fair-value model improves markedly and becomes indistinguishable from its 22 Our inferences appear to differ from those of Barth (1991) , who finds that fair-value pension net asset numbers are more reliable than SFAS-87 (smoothed) numbers. However, our tests differ from hers in that she tests whether fair-value pension assets and liabilities obtain coefficients differing from their theoretical values of one, while we focus on whether replacing smoothing based measures of net pension assets with fair-values improves the smoothing counterpart. The aggregation problem for the fair-value model is highlighted by opposing signs of the permanent and G&L pension expense coefficients-the G&L coefficient for the fair-value model is anomalously positive, although its magnitude is small. Also, coefficients on the permanent pension expense coefficients are not significantly different from zero under either fair-value or smoothing models. We caution that exclusion of balance sheet variables could cause correlated omitted variables bias, which probably explains some of these results.
Finally, we report results from estimating the full version of equation (2) in Table 4 Panel C.
Disaggregating the pension and non-pension components improves the fair-value model's explanatory power more than the smoothing model's (refer also to Table 3 Panel C). After disaggregation, the difference in explanatory power between the two models is both statistically and economically insignificant. The fair-value G&L coefficient is now statistically indistinguishable from zero, reflecting its highly transitory nature (Ohlson, 1995) . In contrast, the smoothing G&L coefficient is negative, statistically significant, and similar in magnitude to the permanent pension expense component coefficient. 23 Overall, the difference in R 2 between the fair-value and smoothing models in the aggregate specification (Table 3 Panel C) appears to be driven primarily by aggregation of fair-value's highly transitory G&L component with more permanent income components.
Credit relevance
As noted in Section 2, we assess credit relevance via the fair-value and smoothing models' abilities to explain default probabilities. We proxy default probabilities with Standard and Poor's longterm issuer credit rating, which is defined as the "opinion of an issuer's overall credit worthiness, apart explanatory power of our model. We note that (consistent with Barth, 1991 ) the coefficient on fair-value net pension assets is closer to the theoretical value of one than that on smoothing. 23 In Table 4 , the coefficients on the smoothing G&L component are generally of much greater magnitude than their fair-value counterparts. Note that, under smoothing, G&L amortization only occurs if unamortized gains or losses exceed the 'corridor'. One can view gains or losses accumulating to the point they exceed the corridor as more permanent than those that offset and stay within the corridor. Thus, the smoothing G&L component potentially reflects amortization of relatively permanent gains and losses (producing a high-magnitude coefficient) while the fair-value G&L component reflects all gains and losses, including more transitory ones (producing a low magnitude coefficient RATE i,t equals one through 19 for the 19 distinct S&P rating categories in our sample, ranging from CCC-(not likely to make interest or principal payments) through AAA (extremely strong capacity to pay interest and principal). Higher values represent better credit ratings. LEV i,t is leverage (long-term liabilities divided by total assets), ROA i,t is return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by total assets), and SDROAi,t is the standard deviation of return on assets over the current and preceding four years. COV i,t represents interest coverage and is cash flow from operations plus cash interest paid divided by cash interest paid. 25 We estimate equation (3) with LEVi,t, ROAi,t, and SDROAi,t computed alternatively under the fairvalue and smoothing pension accounting measurements, i.e., with the balance-sheet and income-statement variables embedded in these ratios computed with alternative measurements for net pension assets and net pension expense. 26 We do not compute fair-value and smoothing versions of interest coverage because 24 Both corporate bond yields and credit ratings assess default probability. An advantage of bond yields is that a market equilibrium process determines them, rather than individual judgment. However, they are issue specific, and unlike issuer credit ratings don't capture the overall credit risk of the firm. Research shows debt ratings correlate with the probability of default (Altman 1992) , interest rates (Standard and Poor's 1986), and bond prices (Hand et al., 1992; Liu et al., 1999) establishing a strong connection between ratings and default probabilities. Prior research has used credit ratings as proxies for default probability (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002) . 25 Some define interest coverage as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (i.e., EBITDA) divided by interest expense. We use cash flow because (1) whether EBITDA includes or excludes pension expense, and therefore, whether we would need to compute fair-value and smoothing versions of it, is unclear and (2) cash flow interest coverage is likely closer to the concept credit raters attempt to capture: whether cash flow is sufficient to meet interest payments. Nonetheless, replicating this section's analyses using (EBITDA)/(interest expense) produces qualitatively similar results. 26 We assume net pension assets are classified in the liabilities side of the balance sheet (i.e., positive net pension assets are reported as offsets to liabilities). Our assumption is based on the conceptual argument that pensions are net obligations and that to the extent that there is overfunding it only indicates a reduction in the net liabilities of the firm, i.e., a reduction in expected future cash outflows rather than an increase in future inflows. We also assume that We begin by estimating a pure balance sheet version of equation (3), i.e., after excluding ROAi,t and SDROA i,t . Table 5 Panel A reports these results. Consistent with past research, the coefficients on LEV i,t are negative under both fair-value and smoothing models, suggesting higher leverage is associated with lower ratings. The fair-value model produces a statistically significantly higher R 2 . In Panel B, we report results from a pure income-statement version of equation (3), i.e., after excluding LEV i,t . Under both fair-value and smoothing, the ROA i,t and SDROA i,t coefficients are positive and negative, respectively, as in prior research. Contrary to the balance sheet version, smoothing generates higher (and statistically significant) explanatory power. In combination, these results are consistent with our predictions in section 2.2.2. That is, while credit raters find fair-value of pension net assets more informative when evaluating default risk, they attach more weight to smoothed income, probably because it better reflects the sustainable earnings power of the firm. Finally, in Table 5 Panel C we report results the pension obligations are entirely classified as long-term liabilities. In general, there is little information about where the pension assets/obligations are actually classified by the companies; such information is not always disclosed in footnotes. To the extent that the actual classifications by companies differ from these assumptions, there is measurement error in our computations. Note that, however, whether we treat positive net pension assets as a negative liability or as an asset, its effect on leverage (long term liabilities to total assets), at least directionally, is the same (i.e., in the former case, the numerator of leverage is smaller; in the latter case, the denominator is bigger). Nevertheless, we replicate all our analyses assuming that positive net pension assets are included in total assets (instead of being classified as a negative liability) and find similar results, qualitatively and statistically.
27 RATEi,t is an ordered categorical variable. However, it has many (19) categories and its distribution (not reported), although unimodal and regular, is somewhat positively skewed. Therefore, whether a categorical response model, such as ordered logit, or ordinary least squares (OLS) better suits the data is unclear. Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) estimate their model separately with ordered logit and OLS, finding the two are equally well specified and produce equivalent predictive power. Our objective is to assess differences in explanatory power between fair-value and smoothing. Although OLS can produce downward biased R 2 s when the dependent variable is categorical, we find nearly identical ordered logit pseudo R 2 s and OLS R 2 s with our data. Because of this, and because we are unaware of a statistical test for differences in explanatory power between two categorical response models, we base our statistical tests on OLS R from estimating the full version of equation (3). Overall, combined balance sheet and income statement data under smoothing pension accounting explains credit ratings better than that under fair-value pension accounting. This suggests that the improvement to the credit relevance of balance sheet ratios that the fair-value model achieves is more than offset by deterioration in the credit relevance of income statement ratios.
Equation (3) imposes coefficient equality on the pension and non-pension components of the explanatory variables, reducing the explanatory power of the model if credit raters assign different weights to these components. Accordingly, we disaggregate net pension assets and expense from the nonpension components of the ratios in equation (3) and estimate the following model: Results of the disaggregate specification are reported in Table 6 . As in the aggregate specification, fair-value produces statistically greater R 2 for the balance sheet only specification while smoothing produces a statistically greater R 2 for the income-statement only specification. However, there 28 The standard deviation of ROA decomposed into pre-pension and pension expense components is
LEV-X i,t is LEV i,t excluding net pension assets, LEV-NPA i
and we cannot obtain separate coefficients for the terms under the radical. We could use the variance of ROA instead, but no anecdotal, survey, or other empirical evidence suggests credit raters use covariance terms in producing credit ratings. Therefore, we do not decompose SDROA i,t into its pension and non-pension components. is no significant difference in R 2 for the combined model. Relative to the aggregate model (Table 5 Panel C), disaggregating the pension components produces greater gains in explanatory power for the fair-value model. Additionally, the coefficient on ROA-G&Li,t is near zero under fair-value but significantly negative under smoothing. 29 These results suggest the fair-value G&L component is credit irrelevant.
Sub-period analysis
Because of an unusual combination of declining stock market and low interest rates, the 2000-2002 period exhibits an unprecedented decrease in pension funding levels. 30 As Figure 1 We find no significant differences across the two sub-periods in our value relevance analyses.
Major value relevance inferences that we draw from the complete sample period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) are largely applicable to both sub-periods (1991-1999 and 1999-2002) . Our credit relevance results, however, differ across the two sub-periods (1995-1999 and 2000-2002) . In the aggregate specifications, results are as follows: (1) In the disaggregate specifications (i.e., those with ratios disaggregated into the pension and nonpension components), sub-period results are as follows: (1) (2) income under the smoothing model is more credit relevant than that under fair-value.
Interpretation and inferences
Our results suggest the following. First, fair-value pension accounting does not improve the value relevance of the balance sheet either in the aggregate (i.e. total book value of equity) or disaggregate (i.e.
net pension assets separated from non-pension net assets) form. On the contrary, fair-value improves the credit relevance of the balance sheet (except during the abnormal 2000-2002 period). Second, fair-value pension accounting can impair both the value and credit relevance of the income statement. Fair-value net income is less value relevant than smoothing net income and the difference can be traced to aggregating the highly transitory G&L component with more persistent income components. Similarly, income statement ratios are less credit relevant under fair-value than under smoothing, especially during the abnormal 2000-2002 period but separating G&L from other income components makes little difference for income statement's credit relevance.
Finally, fair-value pension accounting does not improve either the value or the credit relevance of the combined balance sheet and income statement. On the contrary, the fair-value model impairs value and credit relevance unless the G&L component is separated from other income components. With respect to the credit relevance results, we must condition this statement on the time-period examined.
During the abnormal 2000-2002 period when funding levels plunged, fair-value accounting impairs combined balance sheet and income statement credit relevance, unless G&L is separated from other income components. These results may arise both because creditors view the lower funding levels as not indicative of the true economic obligation and because large G&L components during this period reduce income persistence. 31 During the more normal 1995-1999 period, the fair-value model improves the credit relevance of the combined financial statements irrespective of whether G&L is separated from other income components.
Our evidence has the following implications for standard setters. First, the FASB's proposal to move toward fair-value pension accounting is unlikely to improve the value/credit relevance of financial statements and may even impair value/credit relevance unless transitory G&L is separated from more persistent operating income components. While such a separation is envisaged in Phase I of FASB's proposed standard-by including G&L in other comprehensive income-it is expected that G&L may be included along with net income components when Phase II of the proposed standard gets implemented 31 Creditors may not view the lower funding levels of the 2000-2002 period as indicative of actual economic obligations, either because they believe these conditions are temporary or because they believe firms will negotiate away some of the obligations (e.g. through revised labor contracts or putting some of the obligations on the PBGC). (Moran and Cohen, 2005) . Second, fair-value pension accounting can provide superior information to creditors primarily by improving the credit relevance of the balance sheet, although the credit relevance of the income statement will continue to suffer unless G&L is displayed separately. However, even credit relevance may be impaired under the fair-value model during unusual times, such as 2000-2002 when plunging funding levels resulted in negative funded status and large magnitude G&L. Finally, FASB will need to consider the trade-off between the relevance of the income statement and balance sheet when implementing a broad-based adoption of the fair-value accounting model. Finally, our evidence over the less unusual 1995-1999 period suggests that standard setting implications may differ between equity investors and creditors. While the smoothing model generates summary financial statement numbers that are more value relevant than those generated by the fair-value model, the fair-value balance sheet is more credit relevant which drives greater combined balance sheet and income statement credit relevance. The apparent inconsistency between our value and credit relevance results likely reflects the differential information needs of equity investors and creditors.
Specifically, creditors likely weight the balance sheet vis-à-vis the income statement more heavily than do equity investors. Also equity investors are interested in predicting future earnings generated from the firm's net assets (value-in-use) while creditors are more interested in liquidation value (value-inexchange). Fair-values are likely better indicators of value-in-exchange than of value-in-use.
Conclusion
We compare the value and credit relevance of financial statements alternatively measured under smoothing and fair-value pension accounting models. Fair value pension accounting provides no improvement in the value relevance but improves the credit relevance of the balance sheet (except during the abnormal 2000-2002 period) . Fair values pension accounting impairs the value and credit relevance of income statement and also that of the balance sheet and income statement combined. Separating the transitory G&L from more persistent income components produces combined balance sheet and income statement information that is essentially of equal value and credit relevance under the two models.
Overall, our results suggest changing to fair-value pension accounting is unlikely to improve either the value or credit relevance of financial statements, and can impair their relevance unless the transitory pension G&L is separated from other income components.
Our study makes the following contributions. First, while much research examines the relative and incremental information content of fair value pension disclosures, we compare the value (and credit) relevance of the combined financial statements under alternative pension accounting models.
Additionally, we introduce the concept of credit relevance and show that standard setting inferences can differ when examined from equity investors' and creditors' perspectives. Finally, although our results are neither necessary nor sufficient for framing future standards, we believe they are useful standard setting inputs, as they (1) provide only mixed support for the notion that fair-value pension accounting improves the usefulness of financial statements to equity investors or creditors and (2) suggest separate disclosure of the G&L component, probably in other comprehensive income, is necessary to prevent decline in income relevance. This evidence is particularly pertinent given the FASB's recent addition of (essentially) fair-value pension accounting to its project agenda. Table A1 provides excerpts from AMR Corp's 2002 pension footnote. We use AMR's pension footnote to illustrate the derivation of net pension assets and net pension expense under the fair-value models. We provide Compustat data item numbers, when available, in parentheses.
Appendix A Derivation of Fair-Value Net Pension Assets and Pension Expense
Smoothing Net Pension Assets (Smoothing NPA)
Smoothing NPA is the same as SFAS-87 prepaid or accrued pension cost (#287 + #296) when there is no minimum pension liability (#298 from 1991-1997; hand collected for 1998-2002 due to Compustat's change in coding of data item #298 after SFAS-132). FASB requires recognition of a minimum pension liability (MINPL) when the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) exceeds the fair-value of plan assets. AROPA (actual return on plan assets), actuarial gains/losses (actuarial G&L), and plan amendments (or prior service costs) are presented in Table A1 . These data items, however, are not available in Compustat and, therefore, we cannot derive fair-value PX using the above formula. However, there are two alternative ways to compute fair-value PX. Where: Smoothing PX: Net pension expense (#295) FAS87 NPA: FAS87 net pension assets ((#287 + #296 for 1991-1997; handcollected: 1998-2002) MINPL : Minimum pension liability (#298: 1991-1997; hand-collected: 1998-2002) Fair-value NPA: Fair-value net pension assets = FVPA -PBO ((#287+#296) -(#286+#294)) 
The following table provides the amounts recognized in the consolidated balance sheets as of December 31, 2002 and 2001 (in millions) : 
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Net pension expense Change in S&P 500 index
Change in S&P 500 index
Smoothing net pension expense
Fair-value net pension expense Fig. 3 . Income, in millions of dollars, over time: smoothing versus fair-value. Income based on smoothing-model pension accounting is income as reported under SFAS-87. Income based on fair-value-model pension accounting is reported income plus after-tax SFAS-87 net pension expense minus after-tax fair-value-model net pension expense. Fair-value-model net pension expense is the change in fair-value-model net pension assets for all reasons other than employer contributions. Fair-value-model net pension assets are the fair-value of plan assets minus the projected benefit obligation. Income before pension expense is reported income plus after-tax SFAS-87 pension expense. The sample is drawn from all Compustat firms with non-missing pension and share price data from 1991 through 2002.
Income
Income based on fair-value pension accounting
Income based on smoothing pension accounting Income before pension expense Fair-value-model net pension assets are the fair-value of plan assets minus the projected benefit obligation. Smoothing-model income is income as reported under SFAS-87. Fair-value-model net income is reported income plus after-tax SFAS-87 net pension expense minus after -tax fair-value-model net pension expense. EMP is number of employees. R&D is research and development expense. Firm and time subscripts are omitted. All variables (except EMP) are deflated by the number of shares outstanding three months after the end of the fiscal year. P-values for coefficient estimates and their differences are two-sided and White (1980) adjusted. P-values for R-square differences are based on Vuong's (1989) [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . N is the number of firm-year observations. Smoothing-model LEV is reported long-term liabilities less any additional minimum pension liability divided by total assets. Fair-value-model LEV is reported long-term liabilities less SFAS-87 net-pension assets plus fair-value net-pension assets divided by reported total assets, where positive net pension assets are treated as negative liabilities. Smoothing-model ROA is reported income from continuing operations divided by total assets. Fair-value-model ROA is reported income from continuing operations plus after-tax SFAS-87 pension expense minus after-tax fair-value-model net pension expense divided by reported total assets. Smoothing-model SDROA is the standard deviation of smoothing-model ROA over the current and preceding four years. Fair-value-model SDROA is the standard deviation of fair-value-model ROA over the current and preceding four years. COV is cash flow from operations plus cash interest paid divided by cash interest paid. Firm and time subscripts are omitted. P-values for coefficient estimates and their differences are two-sided and White (1980) adjusted. P-values for R-square differences are based on Vuong's (1989) test statistic. The Pseudo R 2 of the corresponding ordered logit regression is computed as: 1 -exp[-2(ln L r -ln L)/No. of obs.], where L r and L are the log-likelihood functions evaluated at the restricted (slopes=0) and unrestricted estimates, respectively. [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . N is the number of firm-year observations. LEV-X is LEV excluding reported net pension assets. Smoothing-model LEV-NPA is negative smoothing-model NPA divided by reported total assets, where smoothing-model NPA is SFAS-87 net pension assets plus any additional minimum pension liability. Fair-value-model LEV-NPA is negative fair-value-model NPA divided by reported total assets, where fair-value NPA is the fair-value of plan assets minus the projected benefit obligation. ROA-X is reported income from continuing operations plus after-tax SFAS-87 net pension expense divided by reported total assets. Smoothing-model ROA-PX is SFAS-87 net pension expense divided by reported total assets. Fair-value-model ROA-PX is fair-value-model net pension expense divided by reported total assets. Fair-value-model PX is the change in fair-value-model net pension assets for all reasons other than employer contributions. Smoothing-model (fairvalue-model) SDROA is the standard deviation of smoothing-model (fair-value-model) ROA over the current and preceding four years. Smoothing-model ROA is reported income from continuing operations divided by total assets. Fair-value-model ROA is reported income from continuing operations plus after-tax SFAS-87 pension expense minus after-tax fair -value-model net pension expense divided by reported total assets. ROA-PPX is PPX divided by total assets, where PPX is the sum of service and interest costs less the expected return on plan assets. ROA-G&L is G&L divided by total assets. Smoothing-model G&L equals amortization of prior service costs, unrecognized net gain/loss, and transition asset/liability. Fair-value-model G&L equals the change in the projected benefit obligation due to actuarial changes, benefits granted for prior service, and differences between actual and expected rates of return. COV is cash flow from operations plus cash interest paid divided by cash interest paid. Firm and time subscripts are omitted. P-values for coefficient estimates and their differences are two-sided and White (1980) 
